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Indiana Legislation, 2012: Part 2 Of 3 – Obscure Redemption Language Remains

The second noteworthy issue arising out of the General Assembly’s 2012 session surrounds Senate Bill 298, which amends Indiana Code § 32-29-8 “Parties to Foreclosure Suit; Redemption,” including Section 3. This post revisits CitiMortgage v. Barabas, including the mystery that is I.C. § 32-29-8-3, about which I wrote last year: Post 1, Post 2 and Post 3. Unfortunately, even though the legislature amended Section 3, the 2012 session didn’t directly tackle Section 3’s obscure redemption provision. Questions arising out of CitiMorgage linger.

New Section 3. Here is Section 3 of I.C. § 32-29-8, as amended by the italicized language, effective July 1, 2012:

A person who:

(1) purchases a mortgaged premises or any part of a mortgaged premises under the court’s judgment or decree at a judicial sale or who claims title to the mortgaged premises under the judgment or decree; and

(2) buys the mortgaged premises or any part of the mortgaged premises without actual notice of:
(A) an assignment that is not of record; or
(B) the transfer of a note, the holder of which is not a party to the action;

holds the premises free and discharged of the lien. However, any assignee or transferee may redeem the premises, like any other creditor, during the period of one (1) year after the sale or during another period ordered by the court in an action brought under section 4 of this chapter, but not exceeding ninety (90) days after the date of the court’s decree in the action.

Redemption/strict foreclosure tweak. The underlined portion above is the source of some uncertainty and was not modified by the General Assembly this year. The critical purpose of the amendment to I.C. § 32-29-8 surrounds section 4 and what amounts to a brand new statutory strict foreclosure action. I.C. § 32-29-7-13 has been amended to state “there may not be a redemption from the foreclosure of a mortgage executed after June 30, 1931, on real estate except as provided in this chapter and in IC 32-29-8.” The new “and in IC 32-29-8” language refers to Section 4, which is momentous legislation related to Indiana mortgage foreclosure law that I will discuss in my next post.

Status. One interpretation of Section 3 and CitiMortgage, which dealt with a rare set of facts, is that a buyer at a sheriff’s sale could acquire the property, only to learn within a year after the sale that a senior mortgagee, by virtue of a previously-unrecorded assignment, could surface and assert an interest in the property. I do not believe that the 2012 statutory amendments directly impact, or help clarify, the CitiMortgage holding. Even with the new Section 4, I.C. § 32-29-8, Section 3, needs a little more attention from the General Assembly. I’m afraid Section 3 unwittingly opens the door to litigation concerning post-sale rights of redemption in Indiana.  (Note:  On 4-10-12, the Supreme Court granted transfer in CitiMortgage.)

Borrowers unaffected. The General Assembly’s amendments do not (should not) affect a mortgagor’s (owner’s) right of redemption. Such parties still need to redeem before the sheriff’s sale. If not, Indiana law provides that a mortgagor’s right to or interest in the subject real estate will be fully and finally terminated – even though, interestingly, there is no specific statute stating as much. The rule is inferred from the totality of I.C. § 32-29-7 and confirmed by case law.


Indiana Legislation, 2012: Part 1 Of 3 – Abandonment Of Mortgaged Property

The Indiana General Assembly’s 2012 session addressed three noteworthy issues related to Indiana Commercial Foreclosure Law. Today’s post is about House Bill 1238 and its amendment to Indiana Code § 32-29-7-3.

Three-month waiting period. Indiana has a post-complaint, three-month waiting period before sheriff’s sales can be requested. My July 30, 2010 post noted the exception to the three-month rule, which exception did not at the time apply to commercial properties – only residential.

The new I.C. § 32-29-7-3(a)(2). The amended statute, which becomes effective July 1, 2012, revises the exception to the three-month rule to read: “If the Court finds under I.C. 32-30-10.6 that the mortgaged real estate has been abandoned, a judgment or decree of sale may be executed on the date the judgment of foreclosure or decree of sale is entered, regardless of the date the mortgage is executed.” The new statute deletes the “residential” qualification and thus applies to commercial foreclosures now too. Moreover, the statute incorporates a brand new statute – I.C. § 32-30-10.6 – that creates a test and a procedure to determine whether the real estate has been abandoned.

I.C. § 32-30-10.6. This brand new statute is entitled “Determination of Abandonment for Property Subject to a Mortgage Foreclosure Action” and is quite lengthy. If foreclosing lenders or their counsel believe the subject real estate may be abandoned, then this new statute should be studied and followed, assuming there is interest in rushing to a sheriff’s sale. My partner Tom Dinwiddie, who helped draft the legislation, pointed out to me that, in practice, a Section 10.6 motion should be filed with the Complaint or, at the latest, with the Motion for Default Judgment in order to take advantage of the exception to the three-month rule.

Commercial application. As noted by one of my 2006 posts, Indiana’s judicial foreclosure process takes time. In my experience, the three-month waiting period rarely comes into play in commercial actions. Nevertheless, in instances where the commercial property is abandoned, this new legislation establishes a process that, in theory, permits lenders to get the property to a sheriff’s sale faster.


 


Property Owner May Dodge Tax Sale Bullet

This is my fourth post regarding Indiana tax sales, which is the method by which Indiana counties foreclose on real estate in order to collect delinquent real estate taxes. Once again, these issues are relevant to lenders because tax sales terminate mortgages. McCord Investments v. Sawmill Creek, 210 Ind. App. LEXIS 2250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) is another recent Indiana decision dealing with the tax sale notice requirements. (Also see my posts of November 16, 2010 [pre-sale notice] and December 30, 2011 [post-sale notice].) In McCord, the property owner received quite a break, in my opinion, but the case isn’t over. The Indiana Supreme Court has granted transfer and vacated the Court of Appeal’s decision. Once the Supreme Court issues its opinion, I’ll update this post.

Procedural history. In McCord, County appealed an order granting owner’s motion to set aside a tax deed. The opinion centered upon the adequacy of County’s attempts to provide notice of the sale. Even though the County followed Indiana’s statutory scheme at the time, the Court found the notice to be constitutionally inadequate.

Comedy of errors. The Court of Appeals recognized that:

this entire controversy could have been avoided had [the owner] shown even a modicum of responsibility himself. He could have made certain that the Lot was deeded to Sawmill Creek instead of “Saw Creek.” Had he properly ensured that his current address for the taxation of the Lot was on file with the Auditor, and if he had simply noticed that he had not been paying the taxes due on the Lot, all of the current controversy could have been avoided.

Nevertheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the owner.

Indiana’s statutory tax sale scheme. The McCord case arose out of pre-2006 events, and Indiana’s tax sale statutes have been amended since then. The tax sale scheme in Indiana requires three notices to be sent to the property owner in connection with the sale. The first is a pre-sale notice. The second is the right of redemption notice. And the third is the notice of the petition for a tax deed. In McCord, “it appears to be undisputed that [County] complied with the applicable versions of the relevant statutes.”

Constitutional due process. Despite compliance with the statutory scheme, the Court turned to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones v. Flowers, which analyzed the notice requirements of a pending tax sale. Jones established the following notice sufficiency test: while actual notice is not required, notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” In the wake of Jones, Indiana’s General Assembly amended the pre-sale notice statute to deal with notice attempts via certified mail when certified mail is not returned or signed. The new language in Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4 requires a duplicate notice to be sent by first class mail.

McCord, the particulars. The problem in McCord was that County was aware that the owner of the lot had not received any of the three required notices, all of which were sent via certified mail and returned as unclaimed. Again, the question was not what would have been best to ensure the owner did, in fact, receive notice. Instead, the issue was “what additional reasonable steps the County could have taken that were reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action after the initial attempts at notice were returned as unclaimed.” The Court concluded that the County could have resent the notice by first class mail – even though the statutes did not require it at the time. Had the County done that, it appears that the outcome of the litigation would have been different. It remains to be seen what the Indiana Supreme Court will do.

Lender claim? The question I’m left to ponder is whether a mortgagee would have standing to set aside a tax deed if there was evidence the mortgagor did not receive the appropriate notices. In other words, could a lender make an owner’s case so as to preserve title and, in turn, the mortgage lien? Lenders may not be able to avail themselves of the constitutional protections afforded to owners, which is to say that a lender may not catch the break the owner got in McCord.

NOTE:  The Indiana Supreme Court has reversed the Court of Appeals.  Click here for my post.


Judgment Deemed Satisfied After Defendant Guarantor Utilizes Strawman To Purchase It

In commercial foreclosure actions, creative parties and counsel often reach unique settlements that satisfy the needs of both the lender and the borrower or guarantor(s). The case of TacCo v. Atlantic Limited Partnership, 937 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) shows such creativity in action. TacCo is a lesson in satisfaction of judgments and the strawman defense, but the more interesting facet of the case is the maneuvering between co-guarantors over their shared exposure to a $3.2MM judgment.

Players. I’ll label the key players in TacCo as follows: Lender, Borrower, Strong Guarantor, Strawman and Weak Guarantor. “Strong” and “weak” signify that one of the co-guarantors seemingly had the financial capacity or willingness to pay the debt, while the other did not. Lender initiated a commercial mortgage foreclosure action against Borrower, Strong Guarantor and Weak Guarantor. The suit resulted in a judgment for $3.2MM.

Post-judgment settlement. Before the sheriff’s sale, Lender and Strong Guarantor entered into a settlement agreement that centered on Lender’s sale of the judgment for $1.5MM in cash, a $1.5MM promissory note and a $250,000 letter of credit. On paper, the settlement was conditioned upon Strong Guarantor’s ability to locate a purchaser of the judgment, which purchaser ended up being Strawman. Lender obtained the cash and promissory note, and Strawman obtained an assignment of the judgment. Strawman then submitted a credit bid at the sheriff’s sale for $1.5MM and acquired the subject property.

Purpose. Lender got paid off, but Weak Guarantor was not a part of the deal. Although Weak Guarantor and Strawman submitted conflicting evidence and theories, it appears that the settlement was structured to deliver Strong Guarantor the real estate and to expose Weak Guarantor to judgment enforcement (collection) efforts by Strawman.

Post-settlement motion. After the settlement occurred, Weak Guarantor filed a motion for entry of satisfaction of judgment. See, Ind. Trial Rule 67(B) . Weak Guarantor asserted that the judgment had been paid in full. Strawman contended that the judgment still existed and that, as the assignee of the judgment, it could collect the entire $1.7MM+ deficiency from Weak Guarantor.

Judgment satisfaction rules. The legal issue was whether the intent of the post-judgment settlement transaction was to extinguish the judgment against Strong Guarantor. The Court in TacCo outlined the applicable Indiana legal principles:

1. Payment of a judgment by one of the judgment debtors (defendants) is a satisfaction of the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that an assignment of the judgment is made to such debtor or to someone else.
2. Where a strawman is used by a co-debtor to purchase an assignment of a judgment, the judgment is deemed to have been purchased by one of the joint judgment debtors.
3. The controlling fact in such a case is the payment by one legally bound to pay, and the fact that an assignment is made to him or to someone else is not of controlling importance.
4. If one whose duty is to pay the debt makes the payment, then an assignment will not keep the debt alive.

Judgment satisfied. Without regurgitating all of the detail here, the Court in TacCo followed the money, evaluated the actors’ involvement and concluded that Strawman and Strong Guarantor essentially were the same entity. Here is how the Court of Appeals in TacCo applied the rules to reach its conclusion:

We conclude that the evidence presented to the trial court showed that [Strong Guarantor] made payment to [Lender] to purchase the Consent Judgment and assigned the judgment to [Strawman]. . . . Here, [Strong Guarantor] was a party legally bound to pay the judgment, and the evidence showed that it was the party who made payment to [Lender] for purchase of the judgment. The fact that an assignment of the judgment was made to [Strawman] does not change the fact that such payment resulted in a satisfaction of the judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that [Strong Guarantor] used [Strawman] as its strawman to purchase the Consent Judgment and deemed that the judgment had been satisfied.

Result. The upshot was that the judgment no longer existed, and Weak Guarantor’s exposure to the full $1.7MM+ deficiency disappeared. Strawman thus could not enforce the judgment against Weak Guarantor.

Arguably, Strong Guarantor still might have a contribution claim against Weak Guarantor for a pro rata portion of the deficiency ($850,000+), but the Court did not address that issue. In the end, the settlement structure in TacCo was a creative design for Strong Guarantor that didn’t quite work.